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Abstract 
 
 
This study presents evidence on two questions relating to research into the influence 
of leadership on mass political behaviour: the impact of leaders on voting in 
referendums and the influence of non-institutionalised political personalities. 
Research in Australia demonstrating that voter evaluations of leading politicians 
affect party choice in national elections has emphasised that in general it is only the 
current or recent leaders of the major parties who have an impact. Research through 
the 1990s has also shown that attitudes towards the major party leaders have 
consistently influenced voter stances on the question of whether Australia should 
become a republic. In the November 1999 republican referendum, the leaders of the 
two opposing campaigns – Malcolm Turnbull and Kerry Jones – were not mainstream 
politicians or party political figures at all. This paper uses data from the 1999 
Australian Constitutional Referendum Study to investigate the extent to which 
responses to the leading personalities shaped voting decisions in the referendum and 
in particular to determine whether voters focused more on the republican and 
monarchist campaign leaders or on the leaders of the major political parties.  
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Introduction 
Despite an earlier view persisting for many years among academic researchers that the 
independent influence of political leaders on voting behaviour in parliamentary 
democracies was negligible, more recent research has established that political 
personalities do have a significant electoral impact (see Dalton 1996: 233-34; 
McAllister 1996). Although this finding has become increasingly widely accepted, 
much work remains to be done in specifying the nature of leadership effects and the 
conditions under which they occur. For example, research into the influence of 
leading politicians has focused almost exclusively on the role of political party leaders 
in national parliamentary elections.  
This study seeks to advance theoretical knowledge on leadership effects by 
investigating the influence political leaders may have on voting in contexts other than 
legislative elections – in this case, constitutional referendums – and also by 
investigating whether non-institutionalised political personalities – individuals who 
are politically prominent but are not leaders of political parties – may influence mass 
political behaviour. 
In November 1999 social scientists were provided with a rare opportunity to 
study the influence of personalities on political behaviour when two individuals from 
outside of the conventional party political arena became the leaders of the opposing 
sides of the campaign in the constitutional referendum held to decide whether 
Australia should become a republic with a president appointed by a two-thirds 
majority of members of the federal parliament.1 The ‘yes’ campaign was led by the 
                                                 
1 The result of the referendum was a defeat for the proposal, with 54.87 per cent of the electorate voting 
against the proposal nationwide compared to 45.13 per cent voting in favour. See Irving (2000) for 
further details. 
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chairman of the Australian Republican Movement (ARM), Malcolm Turnbull, while 
the ‘no’ campaign was led by the Executive Director of Australians for Constitutional 
Monarchy (ACM), Kerry Jones.  
With the major political parties taking no formal stance on the referendum 
question, Australians were placed in the intriguing position of having to respond to 
campaign messages delivered by two people external to mainstream politics and who 
had not been elected through any form of popular vote. Of course, both the Liberal 
prime minister, John Howard, and the Labor leader of the opposition, Kim Beazley, 
made no secret of their support for the ‘no’ and ‘yes’ campaigns, respectively, but 
particularly with other senior Liberal Party politicians prominently supporting the 
‘yes’ case, the messages from the major parties were by no means absolutely clear. 
 Previous Australian research on the impact of leadership images on voting 
behaviour in national elections has shown that by and large it is only the current or 
recent past leaders of the major parties who can expect to have an influence on party 
choice. A study of leadership effects in five federal elections from 1977 to 1987 
examined the electoral impact of public attitudes towards Labor Party leaders Gough 
Whitlam, Bill Hayden and Bob Hawke and Liberal Party leaders Malcolm Fraser, 
Andrew Peacock and John Howard across all five elections (Bean and Kelley 1988: 
82-83). Focusing on the vote for the two major party groupings – the Liberal and 
National parties versus the Labor Party – the study found that it was not until each of 
these politicians became leader of his party that he started to have a significant effect 
on voter behaviour and that this effect remained while he was leader and for an 
election or two afterwards but then trailed off.  
Elsewhere, the same study also demonstrated the lack of impact in the 1987 
federal election of the leader of the Liberal Party’s coalition partner the National 
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Party, Ian Sinclair, and the unusual circumstances of that election which saw the 
Queensland premier, Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen have a significant effect (Bean and 
Kelley 1988: 87-90).2 More recent research has reinforced the fact that Bjelke-
Petersen’s influence on electoral choice in 1987 is very much an exception to the rule 
that none apart from the prime minister and leader of the opposition, and perhaps their 
recent predecessors, will affect support for the two major parties at national elections. 
For example, analysis of the 1998 federal election suggests that neither National Party 
leader and deputy prime minister Tim Fischer, deputy Liberal leader and Treasurer 
Peter Costello, deputy Labor leader Gareth Evans or prominent Labor politician 
Cheryl Kernot had any significant effect on major party voting (Bean and McAllister 
2000).  
If one strand of research suggests that among political personalities only prime 
ministers and leaders of the opposition affect the vote in national elections, another 
has shown that these same major party leaders have consistently influenced voter 
attitudes on the question of whether Australia should become a republic throughout 
the 1990s. In particular, Christian Leithner’s (1994) study drawing on data from 1993 
found that attitudes towards the then prime minister, Paul Keating, had an effect on 
public preferences for a republic or a monarchy that rivalled or surpassed that of the 
acknowledged factors of age and partisan preference. More recently, Bruce Tranter 
(1999a; 1999b) has shown both major party leaders to have had a substantial 
influence on republican attitudes net of a wide range of other attitudinal and social 
structural factors in 1993, 1996 and 1998. 
                                                 
2 Bjelke-Petersen was a state premier with an unusually high national profile who in 1987 embarked on 
what became known as the ‘Joh for PM’ campaign (Coaldrake 1989: 13-15). Though a spectacular 
failure, the campaign increased the Queensland premier’s national notoriety and ultimately led to his 
having an adverse impact on support for the Liberal-National coalition. 
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There is, of course, no guarantee that an influence on either an abstract 
attitudinal question or on political choice in general elections will translate into an 
influence on voting behaviour in a constitutional referendum. Evidence on such 
events is scarce. Two Canadian studies, however, do contain evidence of the 
relevance of party leader images to the vote decision in referendums. One of the 
studies, of the Canadian constitutional referendum of 1992 does, led the authors to 
conclude that ‘the role of individual leaders [mattered], particularly that of the 
unpopular prime minister whose task it was to attempt to sell the agreement to a 
sceptical public’ (LeDuc and Pammett 1995: 30). In fact Lawrence LeDuc and Jon 
Pammett went so far as to argue that the prime minister, Brian Mulroney’s, ‘massive 
unpopularity cost [the referendum proposal] heavily in terms of votes … quite 
possibly enough to defeat it in the country as a whole’ (1995: 31). In their study of the 
Quebec referendums of 1980 and 1995, Pammett and LeDuc (2001) similarly 
concluded that leadership was an important influence. 
The key question for this paper is whether either the mainstream political party 
leaders or the referendum campaign leaders had any such similar influence on voting 
in the 1999 Australian constitutional referendum. The evidence from previous 
research as outlined above would suggest that if any personalities were to affect 
people’s referendum votes it would be likely to be the prime minister and leader of 
the opposition. As established political leaders they have the advantage of familiarity 
– they are highly salient political figures and known quantities to the voters and for 
this reason the voting public may be likely to take most notice of referendum 
campaign messages as interpreted and delivered through these major party leaders.  
Yet the circumstances of the 1999 referendum were unique in the sense that 
the central focus of the campaign rested not on the Liberal Party’s John Howard and 
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the Labor Party’s Kim Beazley, but on the ARM’s Malcolm Turnbull and the ACM’s 
Kerry Jones. Thus it is Turnbull and Jones who should logically be most closely 
associated in the public mind with the messages presented to voters about the merits 
of the cases for and against the referendum proposal. But what may inhibit their 
influence on referendum voting behaviour is the outsider status of the referendum 
campaign leaders as manifested in their lack of well-defined personal profiles and 
established political credentials, together with the absence of an ongoing political role 
for these individuals associated with the outcome of the referendum. If these factors 
combined to undermine the perceived legitimacy of Turnbull and Jones as political 
leaders it is conceivable that in focusing on the referendum voters may bypass the 
campaign leaders and focus on the familiar party leaders. 
 
Popularity 
This paper uses sample survey data from the 1999 Australian Constitutional 
Referendum Study in order to address the question posed above. The nationwide 
survey was conducted by mail in the immediate aftermath of the referendum, using a 
systematic random sample of the Commonwealth electoral roll drawn by the 
Australian Electoral Commission. The design provided for over-samples of smaller 
states. The response rate after several follow-up mailings was 59 per cent with a final 
unweighted sample size of 3431. Further details can be found in Gow et al. (2000). 
For this analysis the data have been weighted by state and vote in the republican 
referendum, yielding a weighted sample size of 2311. 
 The investigation begins by looking at descriptive data from ‘feeling 
thermometer’ type ratings of various politicians, political parties and groups that 
featured in the referendum campaign, in order to get an initial sense of their relative 
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popularity profiles. The questions were introduced in the survey by the following 
statement: ‘Finally in this section, we would like to know what you think about each 
of the following political groups. Please rate each group on a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 0 means you strongly dislike that group and 10 means that you strongly like 
that group. If you are neutral about a particular group or don’t know much about 
them, you should give them a rating of 5.’ After respondents rated the various 
political groups, the battery of leaders was then introduced by the following: ‘Again 
using a scale from 0 to 10, please show how much you like or dislike the following 
political figures. Again, if you don’t know much about them, you should give them a 
rating of 5.’3  
Table 1 arrays first the politicians and then the parties and groups according to 
their broad stance on the republic referendum. It shows the mean rating, standard 
deviation, percentage of neutral responses and total number giving a rating for each 
politician and political group. Consistent with the theoretical concerns outlined at the 
beginning of the paper, we concentrate initially on the leaders of the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
referendum campaigns, Turnbull and Jones, and the two major political parties, 
Beazley and Howard, and their respective political groups. 
Given the well-publicised leadership problems experienced by Turnbull as 
chairman of the ARM and public face of the push for an Australian republic, it would 
not be surprising to see his image looking poor by comparison with those of the other 
leaders. Turnbull, in his own words, had been branded a ‘chardonnay-swilling elitist’ 
(1999: 79) by his critics and the perceived elitism of the pro-republican campaign has 
been suggested as one of the reasons for the referendum’s defeat (Irving 2000: 112). 
                                                 
3 Seven parties and groups and six political leaders were listed in the following order: Liberal Party, 
Labor Party (ALP), National Party, One Nation, Australian Democrats, Monarchists, Republicans; Kim 
Beazley, John Howard, Meg Lees, Pauline Hanson, Malcolm Turnbull, Kerry Jones. 
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In his account of the events leading up to the referendum, Turnbull confessed he knew 
that if the referendum were successful his critics would say that the victory was 
despite his ‘appalling arrogance, elitism and general political incompetence’; Turnbull 
added: ‘Leadership was, and remained, a fundamental problem for me and for the 
ARM’ (1999: 79, 80).  
[Table 1 about here] 
 Table 1, however, suggests that Turnbull’s image did not suffer particularly by 
comparison with that of Jones. The mean rating for Turnbull on the scale running 
from 0 to 10 was 3.82, with a standard deviation of 2.49. The mean for Jones was 
very similar but in fact slightly lower than for Turnbull, at 3.76, with a smaller 
standard deviation of 2.34. Thus, while both campaign leaders registered clearly on 
the negative side of a popularity ledger on which a score of 5 would indicate that on 
balance a leader was no more liked than disliked, Turnbull was not more unpopular 
than Jones. The standard deviation figures do show, though, that opinions about 
Turnbull tended to be more spread across the range from positive to negative, with 
more respondents rating him near either the top or bottom of the scale.  
 If we direct our attention to near the bottom of Table 1, where we have similar 
data on the public’s views about ‘republicans’ and ‘monarchists’, a somewhat 
different comparative picture emerges. When we look at how the two campaign 
leaders compare with ratings of the groups they represented in the referendum 
campaign, we find that Jones was no less popular than monarchists in general (in fact 
she scored slightly better than the group) but that Turnbull rated well behind 
republicans, whose mean rating was 4.93. In this sense, Turnbull’s image had the 
potential to drag his cause down in a way that Jones’s did not, an issue to which we 
return later in the paper. 
 8
 Turning to the major party leaders, we see that the ratings of both leaders of 
the major Australian political parties were considerably more positive than the ratings 
of the two referendum campaign leaders. In particular, the Labor leader, Beazley, 
stands out as not only the most popular politician (with a mean rating of 5.62) but also 
as having the highest popularity rating of any of the leaders, political parties and 
groups rated in the survey, although he only narrowly beat his party (Labor’s mean 
rating being 5.54). Howard, on the other hand, rated behind his party (averaging 5.08 
compared with the Liberal Party score of 5.33), even though he was the second most 
popular leader, albeit in a field where most politicians and parties tended to rate as 
relatively unpopular. The exceptionally low ratings of Pauline Hanson and her One 
Nation Party (at just under and just over 2, respectively) help to put the scores for the 
other political figures in perspective.  
 The data in the third and fourth columns of Table 1 add a further important 
dimension to the picture. It is immediately apparent from the large percentages of 
respondents giving them neutral ratings that Turnbull and particularly Jones had much 
less well formed images in the public mind than the mainstream political leaders. In 
Jones’s case, virtually half of all those respondents who gave her a rating placed her at 
5, the point on the scale where respondents are instructed to place leaders if they 
‘don’t know much about them’. Turnbull was not far behind. This uncertainty 
amongst the sample about these two political figures is reinforced by the number of 
respondents shown in the last column of the table giving each leader a rating of any 
kind. Over 150 members of the weighted sample declined to rate Jones and Turnbull 
compared to around 80 for Beazley and Howard. Of the other individuals and groups 
listed in the table, only the Australian Democrats leader, Meg Lees, came close to 
having as many respondents give her a neutral rating as did for the referendum 
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campaign leaders and, although ahead of the minor parties, Jones and Turnbull were 
well behind the major parties and other politicians (apart from Lees) in terms of the 
number of respondents recording a rating for them at all. 
 
Effects on the Referendum Vote 
The lack of strong and distinctive images for the republican and monarchist 
referendum campaign leaders, as revealed by the characteristics of their ratings, 
should lead us to be cautious about any expectations that either Turnbull or Jones 
might have had a substantial impact on the referendum vote. This is the question to 
which we now turn in the remainder of the paper.  
Table 2 presents data showing the effects on voting in the republican 
referendum of the images of the referendum campaign leaders plus the major and 
minor political party leaders, together with a number of attitudinal control variables, 
including attitudes towards republicans and monarchists, identification with the major 
political parties, ratings of the Australian Democrats and One Nation and multiple-
item scales measuring attitudes on two central aspects of the republican referendum 
debate, support for the Queen and the status quo, on the one hand, and support for the 
benefits of becoming a republic, on the other.4 The dependent variable is scored 1 for 
a ‘yes’ vote and 0 for a ‘no’ vote in the referendum. The ratings variables are scored 
between 0 and 10, the two attitudinal variables at the top of the table are scored 
                                                 
4 The items making up each of these scales were identified through factor analysis. The scale 
measuring support for the Queen and the status quo is comprised of six items asking respondents’ 
views on the importance of the Queen, whether the Australian flag should be retained, whether 
Australia should keep its remaining constitutional ties with Britain, whether the republic debate is a 
distraction from Australia’s real problems, whether the Queen plays an important part in guaranteeing 
the democratic rights of Australians and whether the Queen promotes British rather than Australian 
interests. The scale measuring support for the benefits of a republic is comprised of three items asking 
respondents whether they believe the proposed change to a republic would make Australia a more 
independent country, improve its standing in the world and make Australia’s government more 
democratic. 
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between 0 and 1 and party identification is scored 0 for Labor, 1 for Liberal-National 
and 0.5 for minor parties and non-identifiers. The first column of the table contains 
zero-order correlations between the independent variables and referendum vote, the 
second and third columns contain first unstandardised and then standardised 
regression coefficients from an OLS regression analysis (which are more intuitively 
interpretable than logistic regression coefficients) and the fourth column contains 
coefficients from a logistic regression analysis (which is a more technically 
appropriate statistical method than OLS with a dichotomous dependent variable). 
Although they are not shown in the table, the OLS and logistic regression equations 
also control for a large number of social structural variables.5 
[Table 2 about here] 
What immediately stands out in the results is that broad attitudes towards the 
substantive issues in the republican referendum played a much larger part in the 
referendum vote than the images of the various political leaders. In this analysis, the 
scale measuring support for the Queen and the status quo had easily the strongest 
impact on whether respondents voted no or yes in the referendum, with ratings of 
republicans and monarchists and support for the benefits of a republic also having 
substantial effects. But what of leadership effects? Neither of the minor political party 
leaders, Hanson or Lees, had any direct effect. Nor did the prime minister, in spite of 
the fact that ratings of Howard had a sizeable zero-order correlation of -.30 with 
voting yes in the referendum. Beazley, however, did have a significant, though 
modest, impact, with voters who strongly liked the leader of the opposition being 
                                                 
5 The social structural variables included in the equations are: gender, age, education, occupation, 
employment status; trade union membership, subjective social class, income, religious denomination, 
church attendance, urban/rural residence, birthplace, state. Further details are available from the author 
on request. 
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around 10 per cent more likely to vote for a republic in the referendum than those who 
strongly disliked him.  
But the most interesting finding in the table is that both the republican and 
monarchist campaign leaders, Turnbull and Jones, had significant direct effects on the 
referendum vote, albeit much reduced compared to their respective zero-order 
associations. Voters who strongly liked Turnbull were about 13 per cent more likely 
to vote for a republic than those who strongly disliked him and voters who strongly 
liked Jones were some 16 per cent more likely than those who strongly disliked her to 
vote against the republican option. Thus, without being huge, the effects of the two 
campaign leaders on voting decisions in the referendum, based on a very stringent 
multivariate test, were clearly stronger than for any other political personalities 
examined. 
There were in fact two referendum questions, not one, put to the people on 6 
November 1999 and the analysis concludes by applying our model to the second 
question, whether Australians wanted a preamble inserted at the front of the 
constitution (Table 3). This time there is no strong reason to expect either of the 
referendum campaign leaders to have exerted an influence on the vote, since their 
campaigns related only to the republican question. The prime minister, however, was 
the political architect behind the preamble and he campaigned strongly on its behalf. 
Interestingly, the raw correlation between attitudes to Howard and vote on the 
preamble question was close to zero, but once other factors in the model are taken 
account of ratings of Howard are shown to have had a clear and appreciable net 
impact, such that voters who strongly liked the Liberal Party leader were 18 per cent 
more likely than those who strongly disliked him to vote for the preamble proposal. 
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As anticipated, neither Turnbull nor Jones, nor any of the other leaders had any 
impact on the preamble vote. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Aggregate Effects 
We conclude the analysis with a brief consideration of the implications of the above 
findings for the aggregate balance of the republican vote. By combining the 
regression coefficients with the relative popularity of the campaign leaders we can 
make some hypothetical calculations as to their role in the defeat of the referendum 
proposal. There are at least three plausible ways to make these calculations. The first 
is to compare the popularity of each leader with the midpoint on the scale. The second 
is to compare each leader’s popularity directly to that of the other. Since the mean 
popularity ratings of Turnbull and Jones were very similar, these two methods come 
to much the same thing in the sense that in the first instance the two would be seen to 
do similar amounts of harm to the opposing sides of the campaign and in the second 
instance they would more or less directly cancel each other out.  
 The third method, however, offers a more interesting scenario. It involves 
comparing the leader’s popularity with that of the group they represent. In the case of 
mainstream politicians that group is their party; in the case of Turnbull and Jones it is 
republicans and monarchists respectively. Returning to the data in Table 1, we recall 
that Turnbull was 1.1 points less popular than republicans in general on the 0 to 10 
point scale. Multiplying that difference by the unstandardised regression coefficient 
for Turnbull of .013 gives a net figure of about 1.4 per cent by which his image may 
have been said to reduce the vote in favour of a republic. Jones, on the other hand, 
was very slightly more popular than the group she represented (by 0.06 points) and 
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multiplying this difference by her regression coefficient gives a further 0.1 per cent by 
which she helped the no case.6 Thus, according to this method, the two leadership 
effects combined cost the yes vote about one-and-a-half per cent (all other things 
being equal), which is of course much less than the 5 per cent the referendum was lost 
by, but not an inconsequential slice of the margin nonetheless.7 
 
Conclusion 
The personal images of the leading politicians in the referendum may not have been 
the central influence on how people voted, but they did nonetheless have some 
impact. Thus, Pammett and LeDuc’s (2001: 272) conclusion that ‘[i]n referendums, as 
in elections, the messenger often matters as much as the message’ may be somewhat 
overstated in the case of the Australian constitutional referendum of 1999, but the 
essential point that the messenger does matter is confirmed in this analysis. 
In reflecting on these results, it is important to return to the theoretical issues 
raised at the beginning of the paper. The findings show that political leaders can and 
do influence voting behaviour in contexts other than legislative elections. They also 
show that, in the case of the republican referendum at least, non-institutionalised 
political personalities – in this case the non-party political referendum campaign 
leaders – can and do influence political behaviour. 
                                                 
6 The following sets out the detail of the calculations described in the text.  
Turnbull effect: 3.82 (Turnbull mean) – 4.93 (Republicans mean) = -1.11  
                                -1.11 x .013 (Turnbull regression coefficient) = -.01443 
ie a 1.443 per cent reduction in the yes vote.  
Jones effect: 3.76 (Jones mean) – 3.70 (Monarchists mean) = .06 
                             .06 x -.016 (Jones regression coefficient) = -.00096 
ie a .096 per cent reduction in the yes vote. 
Note that while these calculations provide the best point estimates, they represent small movements 
which in the case of the Jones effect is not significantly different from zero. 
 
7 It is also much less than the 7 per cent that LeDuc and Pammett (1995: 30-32), using the first of the 
three computation methods outlined above, found the Canadian prime minister, Mulroney, to have cost 
the yes vote in that country’s 1992 referendum.  
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We are left with the intriguing question of why the referendum campaign 
leaders should have influenced the vote at all. In general elections it is understandable 
that voters would take the party leaders into account, since one of the competing 
leaders will have to perform the role of prime minister in the ensuing parliament and 
another will have to lead the official parliamentary opposition. The referendum 
leaders were campaigning for no such office, however. After the referendum they 
would have no further political role. One explanation must be that, while performance 
is a relevant consideration in how political leaders are viewed (Miller et al. 1986; 
Wattenberg 1991), so too must be emotional responses (Markus 1988; Ragsdale 
1991). For human beings, how the message is delivered and who delivers it is 
inextricably tied up with how we view that message and in this way the personal 
qualities of a political leader inevitably make a difference to the political choices we 
make, even in circumstances where that leader’s individual political fortunes are not 
directly linked to the outcome.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Summary Ratings of Leaders, Parties and Groups 
on 0-10 Scale 
 
 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Per Cent 
Neutral 
(N) 
Politicians in favour of 
republic: 
    
Republican campaign 
leader (Malcom Turnbull) 
3.82 2.49 42 (2160) 
Labor Party leader (Kim 
Beazley) 
5.62 2.80 18 (2233) 
Australian Democrats 
leader (Meg Lees) 
4.44 2.19 41 (2164) 
Politicians against 
republic: 
    
Monarchist campaign 
leader (Kerry Jones) 
3.76 2.34 49 (2155) 
Liberal Party leader (John 
Howard) 
5.08 3.10 14 (2226) 
One Nation Party leader 
(Pauline Hanson) 
1.99 2.71 12 (2197) 
Parties/groups in favour of 
republic: 
    
Republicans 4.93 2.94 34 (2140) 
Labor Party 5.54 2.94 18 (2206) 
Australian Democrats 4.64 2.41 33 (2139) 
Parties/groups against 
republic: 
    
Monarchists 3.70 2.78 36 (2146) 
Liberal Party 5.33 3.04 17 (2204) 
National Party 4.52 2.47 34 (2137) 
One Nation 2.07 2.75 14 (2153) 
 
Source: Australian Constitutional Referendum Study, 1999, weighted by state and 
referendum vote (n=2311). 
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Table 2: Effects of Leader Ratings and Other Attitudinal Variables on Republican 
Referendum Votea 
 
 
 
 Zero-Order 
Correlation 
Unstandard-
ised OLS 
Coefficient 
Standardised 
OLS 
Coefficient 
Logit 
Coefficient 
 
Support for Queen and 
status quo 
 
 
-.64 
 
 
-.718** 
 
 
-.32 
 
 
-5.198** 
Support for benefits of 
a republic 
 
.45 
 
.294** 
 
.13 
 
2.660** 
Party identification -.25 -.013 -.01 .003 
Ratings of:     
One Nation -.24 -.007 -.04 -.092 
Australian Democrats .21 -.001 -.01 -.045 
Monarchists -.48 -.020** -.11 -.287** 
Republicans .54 .030** .18 .299** 
Kim Beazley .32 .010* .06 .085* 
John Howard -.30 -.003 -.02 -.035 
Meg Lees .08 -.001 -.00 .071 
Pauline Hanson -.24 .001 .01 .065 
Malcolm Turnbull .35 .013** .07 .228** 
Kerry Jones -.28 -.016** -.08 -.261** 
R2   .51  
 
a OLS and logistic regression equations control for a number of social structural 
variables, as listed in footnote 4. 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
Source: Australian Constitutional Referendum Study, 1999, weighted by state and 
referendum vote (n=2311). 
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Table 3: Effects of Leader Ratings and Other Attitudinal Variables on Preamble 
Referendum Votea 
 
 
 
 Zero-Order 
Correlation 
Unstandard-
ised OLS 
Coefficient 
Standardised 
OLS 
Coefficient 
Logit 
Coefficient 
 
Support for Queen and 
status quo 
 
 
-.25 
 
 
-.245** 
 
 
-.11 
 
 
-1.321** 
Support for benefits of 
a republic 
 
.20 
 
.165** 
 
.07 
 
1.049** 
Party identification -.00 .054 .05 .256 
Ratings of:     
One Nation -.17 -.016* -.09 -.064 
Australian Democrats .10 .000 .00 -.024 
Monarchists -.18 -.014* -.08 -.056 
Republicans .23 .015** .09 .093** 
Kim Beazley .12 .008 .05 .047 
John Howard .02 .018** .12 .081** 
Meg Lees .11 .003 .01 .051 
Pauline Hanson -.15 -.001 -.01 -.002 
Malcolm Turnbull .16 .007 .04 .006 
Kerry Jones -.04 .002 .01 .026 
R2   .14  
 
a OLS and logistic regression equations control for a number of social structural 
variables, as listed in footnote 4. 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
Source: Australian Constitutional Referendum Study, 1999, weighted by state and 
referendum vote (n=2311). 
 
 
 
 
